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Agencies	 are	 a	 familiar	 feature	 in	 the	 EU.	 They	 have	 proliferated	 in	 policy	 sectors	 from	
border	 control	 to	medicine	with	 recent	 additions	 including	 an	 enhanced	 European	Border	
and	Coast	Guard	Agency	(‘Frontex’),	and	the	creation	of	a	European	Data	Protection	Board.	
There	 are	 ever	 more	 powerful	 agencies	 emerging,	 whose	 mandate	 can	 extend	 to	 quasi-
regulatory	 and	 direct	 supervisory	 competences.	 Recent	 Commission	 Proposals	 advocate	
further	 expansions	 to	 the	 financial	 European	 Supervisory	 Authorities	 (‘ESAs’)	 mandate;	
bodies	with	 legal	personality	but	 agencies	 in	 all	 but	name.
1
	These	authorities,	 are	a	major	





Although	 agencies	 serve	 a	 number	 of	 valuable	 roles	 within	 the	 EU	 framework,	 they	 are	
unelected	 entities.	Moreover,	 the	 ESAs,	 particularly	 the	 European	 Securities	 and	Markets	
Authority	 (‘ESMA’),	 have	 been	 granted	 increasingly	 broad	 powers,	 yet	 their	 governance	
frameworks	 have	 weaknesses,	 and	 may	 not	 be	 fit	 for	 purpose.	 In	 such	 situations,	




internal	 governance	 arrangements	 and	 robust	 external	 accountability	 mechanisms	 are	
necessary	 to	 ensure	 there	 is	 no	 lacuna.
4
		 This	 generates	 a	 related	 challenge:	 an	 agency’s	




	The	 significance	 of	 this	 has	 by	 no	 means	 gone	 unnoticed	 in	 the	





This	paper	examines	ESMA’s	 governance	arrangements,	 and	whether	 these	 can	ensure	 its	
autonomy	 and	 legitimacy;	 however,	 the	 analysis	 is	 salient	 beyond	 the	 financial	 zone.	 The	
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governance	 reforms	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 Proposal,	 the	 paper	 advocates	 refinements	 to	
better	balance	the	competing	supranational	and	national	interests	within	ESMA.	Moreover,	
it	recommends	paring	back	of	the	Commission’s	presence	in	ESMA’s	governance	framework	
to	 avoid	 stifling	 its	 autonomy.	 Further,	 through	 exploring	 the	 EU	 Banking	 Union’s	 Single	
Supervisory	 Mechanism	 (‘SSM’)	 arrangements	 (whilst	 remaining	 mindful	 of	 its	 specific	
drivers),	 it	 speculates	 that	 the	argument	 for	 the	European	Parliament	 (the	 ‘Parliament’)	 to	
have	 greater	 input	 in	 ESMA’s	 accountability	 framework	 grows	 more	 compelling.	 ESMA	 is	
politically	 accountable	 to	 the	 Parliament,	 and	 regular,	 nuanced	 assessments	 of	 ESMA’s	
activities	by	this	directly	elected	institution	could	be	a	valuable	addition	to	the	accountability	







This	 paper’s	 structure	 is	 as	 follows:	 section	 2	 examines	 the	 emergence	 and	 rationale	 for	
agencies;	 section	 3	 considers	 agency	 design	 within	 the	 EU’s	 constitutional	 framework.	
Section	 4	 examines	 ESMA,	 with	 particular	 reference	 to	 its	 current	 governance	 structures.	








over	 the	 years,	 in	 line	 with	 trends	 observable	 within	 domestic	 regimes,	 matters	 have	
increasingly	 become	 decentralised.	 This	 ‘agencification’	 process	 commenced	 in	 the	 1970s	
and	agencies	have	been	introduced	in	a	wide	range	of	sectors	that	directly	impact	the	lives	
of	 citizens.	Agencies	 are	often	 created	 to	 tackle	distinctive	 issues	 arising	 from	a	particular	




rationales	 are	 articulated	 in	 the	 legal	 and	 political	 science	 literature	 concerning	 for	 their	









	D	 Curtin	 and	 R	 Dehousse,	 ‘European	 Union	 Agencies:	 Tipping	 the	 Balance?’	 in	 M	 Busuioc,	 M	




















the	 benefits	 of	 delegation	 via	 granting	 discretion	 to	 the	 agent,	 and	 the	 agent	 can	 have	




		 This	 principal-agent	model	has	 some	 relevance	with	











Given	this,	 the	development	of	agencies	 in	EU	 law	can	also	be	understood	as	a	product	of	
political	 compromise	 between	 the	 EU	 institutions	 and	Member	 States.	 Specifically,	 as	 the	
single	market	 project	 expanded,	 the	 Commission	 identified	 a	 need	 and	 an	 opportunity	 to	
expand	the	EU’s	regulatory	capacity	but	also	recognised	that	there	would	be	resistance	from	
the	Member	States	in	the	Council	to	additional	transfers	of	power	to	the	Commission.	Given	






In	 conjunction	 with	 this,	 agencies	 can	 also	 be	 appealing	 political	 solutions	 to	 crises:	 for	








create	 new	 agencies,	 especially	 since	 the	 1990s	 reflects	 the	 trends	 within	 administrative	
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terms	 of	 the	 legal	 basis	 used	 in	 practice,	 most	 early	 agencies	 were	 based	 on	 article	 352	
TFEU;	 the	 residual	 basis	 to	 attain	 a	 Treaty	 objective	 where	 no	 other	 provision	 gives	 the	














	More	 recently,	 the	 view	 that	 agencies	 could	 be	 adopted	 on	 the	 internal	



































	This	 is	 an	 important	 limitation	with	 respect	 to	 agencies	 and	 it	 arose	





review	 by	 the	 High	 Authority.
24
		 The	 CJEU	 drew	 its	 famous	 distinction	 between	 clearly	
defined	executive	powers,	the	exercise	of	which	could	be	subject	to	strict	review	in	the	light	






compatible	 with	 the	 Treaty	 requirements.
26
	Accordingly,	 following	Meroni,	 and	 until	 the	






More	 recently,	 however,	 as	 Craig	 argues,	 political	 imperatives	 led	 to	 institutional	
developments,	 which	 placed	 the	 traditional	 legal	 interpretation	 under	 strain.
28
	The	 most	
notable	 case	 being	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
ESAs:	 ESMA,	 the	 European	 Banking	 Authority	 (‘EBA’),	 and	 the	 European	 Insurance	 and	
Occupational	Pension	Authority	(‘EIOPA’).	The	ESAs	stemmed	from	the	de	Larosière	report;	
this	recognised	that	the	strength	of	EU	regulation	and	supervision	was	found	wanting	during	
the	 crisis	 and	 proposed	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 European	 System	of	 Financial	 Supervision,	
which	 included	 the	ESAs.
29
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conferred	 on	 the	 other	 ESAs.	 In	 addition	 to	 its	 more	 orthodox	 ‘soft’	 powers	 (including	
information	exchange	between	authorities),	its	mandate	has	extended	to	encompass	direct	
supervisory	 powers	 over	 particular	 market	 participants	 (including	 credit	 rating	 agencies),	
emergency	 direct	 powers	 of	 intervention,	 and	 limited	 enforcement	 powers.
31
	In	 essence,	
ESMA	 heralds	 a	 new	 dawn	 for	 EU	 agencies.	 Its	 powers	 are	 in	 clear	 contrast	 to	 those	




supervisory	 authority,	 and	 how	 this	 connects	 to	 the	 Treaty	 framework	 and	 Meroni,	
particularly	 in	 light	of	the	UK’s	challenges	in	 its	Short	Selling	application.	This	then	sets	the	




As	 an	 institutional	 matter,	 although	 the	 political	 institutions	 are	 responsible	 for	 adopting	
‘level	1’	EU	legislation,	ESMA,	and	the	other	ESAs,	have	significant	quasi-rule	making	powers.	
This	is	not	the	only	instance	of	agencies	having	the	ability	to	contribute	to	such	procedures;	











soft	 law	measures,	 ESMA	 has	 appreciable	 quasi-rule	making	 powers	 through	which	 it	 can	
directly	 advance	 the	 EU’s	 single	 rulebook.	 ESMA	 can	 prepare	 technical	 standards	 to	 be	
submitted	 to	 the	 Commission	 for	 endorsement	 into	 law.
34
	Depending	 on	 the	 mandate,	
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Regulatory	 technical	 standards	 are	 of	 a	 quasi-legal	 nature	 capable	 of	 amending	 or	
supplementing	 non-essential	 elements	 of	 a	 level	 1	 act.	 ESMA’s	 powers	 represent	 a	














As	 an	 institutional	 matter,	 all	 of	 the	 ESAs	 being	 given	 these	 quasi-rule	 making	 powers	 is	
based	 around	 their	 high	 degree	 of	 professional	 expertise,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	
there	 are	 strong	 legal	 and	 political	 assumptions	 that	 such	 rules	 will	 be	 accepted	 by	 the	
Commission.
38
	Yet	 the	 reality	demonstrates	 there	are	 real	 limitations	on	 the	ESAs’	 reach.
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The	 Advocate	 General	 considered	 that	 articles	 290	 and	 291	 had	 been	 fully	 respected	 but	
took	the	view	that	these	powers	had	been	conferred	directly	by	the	legislature	rather	than	
being	 delegated.	 In	 the	 event	 the	 powers	 had	 been	 delegated,	 however,	 he	 opined	 that	
agencies	could	not	act	directly	under	article	290	(as	this	could	change	the	normative	content	















Financial	 Governance	 and	 the	 Implications’	 (2016)	 17	 EBOR	 451;	 Niamh	 Moloney,	 ‘Institutional	
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40















or	 whether	 other	 systems	 may	 be	 contemplated,	 and	 it	 affirmed	 the	 latter.
43
	It	
acknowledged	 that	 the	 Treaties	 did	 not	 contain	 any	 provisions	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 powers	
could	be	delegated	 to	an	agency,	but	 that	 there	were	provisions	 that	presupposed	 such	a	











designed	 to	 ensure	 financial	 stability	 in	 the	 Union.
46
		 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 CJEU’s	 practical	
approach	helped	 to	bridge	 the	awkward	 ‘constitutional	 gap’	 that	had	been	emerging	with	








Connected	 with	 its	 article	 290	 and	 291	 plea,	 the	 UK	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	 powers	 in	
question	authorised	ESMA	to	adopt	quasi-legislative	measures	of	general	application	having	
the	 force	of	 law,	 contrary	 to	 the	principles	established	by	 the	CJEU	 ruling	 in	Romano.	The	
Advocate	 General	 disagreed,	 taking	 the	 view	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 EU	 constitutional	 law	





The	 CJEU	 also	 rejected	 the	 plea;	 it	 considered	 that	 ESMA	 did	 adopt	measures	 of	 general	
application	but	that	this	had	been	envisaged	by	the	TFEU	and	was	not	at	odds	with	Romano	
(as	 long	as	 the	Meroni	conditions	were	met).	 In	particular,	 the	TFEU,	articles	263	and	277,	
extended	 the	 CJEU’s	 jurisdiction	 to	 review	 legal	 acts	 adopted	 by	 agencies,	 and	 expressly	


































In	 addition	 to	 ESMA’s	 quasi-regulatory	 mandate,	 it	 also	 has	 a	 suite	 of	 supervisory	





















The	 CJEU	 again	 dismissed	 this	 plea	 but	 it	 did	 not	 reject	 Meroni	 outright.	 Rather,	 it	
considered	the	Meroni	principle	to	be	satisfied	as	the	powers	were	precisely	delineated	and	













(and	 its	 sibling	 ESAs)	 on	 a	 firmer	 constitutional	 footing.
57
	As	 Ferran	 argues,	 the	 CJEU	was	
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chose	not	 to	 consider	whether	 the	powers	had	been	actually	 conferred	 rather	 than	being	
delegated	 to	 ESMA.
59




that	were	 put	 to	 the	CJEU;	 a	more	 liberal	 view	 suggests	 that	Meroni	has	 been	mellowed.	
One	way	or	other,	however,	the	greater	according	of	powers	to	new	EU	agencies	has	been	

















an	 executive	 director,	 an	 administrative	 (or	 management)	 board,	 plus	 the	 input	 of	 a	
scientific	 committee.
63
		 Administrative	 boards	 are	 responsible	 for	 ensuring	 the	 agency	










In	 contrast	 to	 the	 orthodox	 framework,	 ESMA	 has	 a	 two-tier	 governance	 system.	 Its	
































The	 Board	 is	 comprised	 of	 experts	 (the	 Member	 States	 via	 the	 heads	 of	 the	 national	
competent	authorities	(‘NCAs’)).	They	are	the	voting	members,	and	operate	under	a	simple	
majority	vote	apart	from	regarding	ESMA’s	quasi-rule	making	powers,	where	QMV	(a	system	
of	 weighted	 votes)	 applies.
67
	The	 Board	 also	 has	 non-voting	 members;	 specifically	 an	












	The	 necessity	 of	 expert	 judgment	 is	 also	 underlined	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	
independent	 Chairperson,	 and	 Executive	 Director.	 Both	 are	 to	 be	 appointed	 following	 an	
open	 selection	 procedure	 on	 the	 basis	 of	merit,	 skills,	 knowledge	 and	 financial	 regulation	
experience	(with	the	Executive	Director	also	requiring	managerial	experience),	although	the	
















Such	 wrangling	 aside,	 the	 Board	 elects	 six	 NCA	 representatives	 from	 the	 Board	 plus	 the	
Chairperson	to	sit	on	ESMA’s	Management	Board.	There	is	the	right	for	the	Commission	and	
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ESMA’s	 governance	model	 has	 a	 strong	 focus	on	 independence	 in	 its	 founding	 regulation.	
This	 differs	 from	many	prior	 agencies,	where	 there	was	 considerable	 variation	 in	 the	way	
independence	 was	 tackled,	 if	 referenced	 at	 all.
75
	Yet	 independence	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 a	
relative	concept;	 the	notion	 is	not	entirely	 followed	through	with	the	structures	 in	place.
76
		
Specifically	 there	 is	 an	 inherent	 tension	 between	 ESMA’s	 European	 mandate	 versus	 the	
national	 remit	 of	 the	 NCAs	 that	 comprise	 the	 Board.	 As	 identified,	 ESMA’s	 independent	
Chairperson	has	a	non-voting	status,	and	the	Board’s	voting	members	are	the	heads	of	the	







by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 national	 authorities	 are	 required	 to	make	 obligatory	 contributions	 to	
ESMA’s	revenues.		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 reality	 is	 likely	 more	 nuanced.	 It	 does	 appear	 in	 practice	 that	 the	
major	 NCAs	 can	 heavily	 influence	 discussions	 and	 decisions,	 but	 this	 is	 balanced,	 to	 an	
extent,	by	the	QMV	influence.	Moreover,	with	respect	to	the	national	position,	authorities	
sometimes	adopt	self-serving	stances,	but	also	adopt	positions	congruent	with	the	European	






ESMA	faces,	especially	 from	the	Commission.	The	Commission’s	 involvement	 in	appointing	
the	Chairperson	and	Executive	Director	has	been	observed.	Its	representation	on	the	Board,	
the	Management	Board	(with	its	voting	capacity	on	the	budget),	plus	the	fact	it	contributes	







	Ibid	 art	 37.	 Although	 concerns,	 such	 as	 of	 consumers	 being	 under-represented	 have	 led	 to	
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Technocracy	 and	 the	 Absorption	 of	 the	UK's	Withdrawal’	 in	Brexit	 and	 Financial	 Services:	 Law	 and	
Policy	(Hart	2018).	
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was	 not	 always	 referenced	 in	 their	 establishing	 acts).	 EU	 agencies	 have	 often	 been	
established	 to	 counter	 credible	 commitment	 failures	by	 the	Commission,	 and	 jeopardising	
independence	 would	 defeat	 the	 purpose	 for	 which	 they	 were	 created.
83
	Yet	 as	 agencies	
flourished	 and	 their	 powers	 increased,	 this	 generated	 rising	 anxiety	 about	 them	 escaping	
control	and	led	to	calls	for	increased	control	and	accountability.	Such	concerns	can	produce	




analysis	 above,	 in	 reality	 independent	 EU	 agencies	 do	 not,	 in	 fact,	 exist.	 	 Rather,	 non-
majoritarian	agencies	are	granted	a	degree	of	autonomy	 (or	 ‘relative’	 independence)	 from	
their	 ‘parent	 bodies’	 but	 not	 full	 freedom,	 and	will	 be	 subject	 to	 various	 constraints	 and	
restrictions.
85





The	 next	 issue	 is	what	 is	meant	 by	 accountability.	 Despite	 its	 central	 place	 in	 the	 agency	
debate,	there	can	sometimes	be	a	lack	of	clarity	about	the	concept.	In	the	agency	literature,	
definitions	 increasingly	 used	 include	 ‘the	 obligation	 to	 explain	 and	 justify	 conduct’;	 and	 a	
‘relationship	between	an	actor	and	a	forum,	in	which	the	actor	has	an	obligation	to	explain	
and	 justify	 his	 or	 her	 conduct,	 the	 forum	 can	pose	questions	 and	pass	 judgment,	 and	 the	
actor	may	 face	 consequences’.
87
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commentators	 still	 use	 the	 terms	 in	 varying	 ways.	 Accordingly,	 this	 section	 considers	 the	





ESMA’s	 ex	 ante	 controls	 include	 the	 boundaries	 in	 its	 establishing	 regulation,	 such	 as	 the	
ambit	 of	 its	 powers	 and	 finances,	 and	 political	 controls	 in	 relation	 to	 appointments.	






accountability	 occurs	 through	 various	 channels,	 including	 the	 national	 authorities	 on	 the	













the	 Council	 and	 Parliament	 under	 its	 founding	 regulation,
94
	and	 is	 subject	 to	 considerable	
duties	 including	 reporting	 requirements	 (such	 as	 transmitting	 its	 work	 programmes	 for	
information,	 plus	 an	 annual	 report	 on	 its	 activities).
95
	ESMA	 also	 engages	more	 informally	
with	the	Parliament,	particularly	with	its	Economic	and	Monetary	Affairs	Committee.	On	the	

















































Taken	 together,	 intricate	 and	 extensive	 governance,	 control,	 and	 accountability	
arrangements	 are	 in	 play	 ranging	 from	 the	 intergovernmental	 to	 the	 inter-institutional.		
These	 systems	 are	 also	 intertwined;	 accountability	 fora	 can	 act	 as	 ‘fire	 alarms’	 for	 other	
fora.
100
		 The	 resulting	 set-up	 is	 complex	 and	 not	 necessarily	 conducive	 to	 guaranteeing	
ESMA’s	 autonomy	 or	 its	 effective	 accountability.
101
		 Indeed	 in	 this	 regard,	 the	 ex	 ante	
legislative	framing	of	ESMA’s	tasks	and	objectives	in	somewhat	broad	and	vague	terms	can	





Early	 reviews	 of	 the	 ESA	 framework,	 including	 the	 IMF’s	 2013	 FSAP	 assessment,	 and	 the	
Parliament’s	 2013	 Mazars	 Review,	 reiterated	 many	 of	 these	 issues.	 These	 reports	
highlighted	 that	 aspects	 of	 ESMA’s	 design	 and	 operation	 should	 be	 reviewed	 as	 existing	
arrangements	 could	 inhibit	 its	 operational	 independence	 and	 proper	 accountability.
103
	In	
this	 regard,	 and	 as	 explored	 in	 section	 6	 below,	 the	 Commission’s	 2017	 Proposal	 now	
includes	 governance	 changes	 including	 transforming	 the	 Management	 Board	 into	 an	
independent	 Executive	 Board.	 Yet	 the	 Commission	 remains	 enmeshed	 in	 ESMA’s	 overall	
framework,	and	the	accountability	system	remains	largely	unchanged.	Accordingly,	although	
the	Proposal	may	contain	useful	initiatives	to	improve	ESMA’s	governance,	these	may	not	go	
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drawn	 from	 it	 in	 relation	 to	ESMA,	particularly	with	 reference	 to	 the	heightened	 role	 that	
the	Parliament	plays	in	relation	to	the	SSM’s	oversight	mechanisms.		
	
It	 was	 the	 financial	 and	 sovereign	 debt	 crises	 that	 demonstrated	 that	 countries	 sharing	 a	
currency	were	 interdependent,	 increasing	the	 likelihood	of	cross-border	spillover	effects	 in	




first	 in	 line	 to	 bail	 out	 ailing	 banks.
108
		 It	 creates	 special	 prudential	 supervision	 and	 bank	
resolution	 arrangements	 for	 the	 euro	 area	 via	 two	 pillars.	 The	 first	 pillar,	 the	 SSM,	 is	
overseen	 by	 an	 EU	 institution,	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 (‘ECB’),
109
	and	 the	 second,	 the	
Single	 Resolution	 Mechanisms	 (‘SRM’),	 is	 coordinated	 by	 the	 Single	 Resolution	 Board	
(‘SRB’).
110
	The	 mechanisms	 are	 mandatory	 for	 Eurozone	 countries	 and	 their	 banks;	 other	
Member	States	can	choose	to	participate	although	none	have	yet	done	so.	Under	the	SSM,	
the	ECB	has	direct	supervisory	responsibility	for	‘significant’	credit	institutions	(currently	119	
banking	 groups),	 and	 it	 oversees	 the	 national	 authorities’	 direct	 supervision	 of	 ‘less	
significant’	 banks	 (currently	 2869	 groups).
111
		 Under	 the	 SRM,	 there	 is	 a	 single	 resolution	











The	ECB’s	 SSM	governance,	 control	 and	accountability	mechanisms	are	designed	 to	 tackle	
conflicts	 of	 interest	 that	 can	 arise	 with	 the	 ECB	 combining	 supervisory	 tasks	 with	 its	
monetary	 policy	 functions.
114
	The	 SSM	 Regulation	 articulates	 that	 monetary	 policy,	 and	
supervisory	 tasks	 under	 the	 SSM	 are	 separate.
115




	Niamh	 Moloney,	 ‘EU	 Financial	 Governance	 after	 Brexit:	 The	 Rise	 of	 Technocracy	 and	 the	
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	ECB,	 Annual	 Report	 on	 Supervisory	 Activities	 for	 2017	 (March	 2018)	 74;	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	
1024/2013	Conferring	 Specific	 Tasks	 on	 the	 ECB	Concerning	 Policies	 Relating	 to	 the	 SSM	 [2013]	OJ	
L287/63,	art	6(4).		
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The	Supervisory	Board	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	planning	and	execution	of	 tasks	conferred	on	








an	 objection	 is	 raised	 within	 a	 specified	 period).
123
	The	 ECB’s	 Governing	 Council	 is	 also	
responsible	for	monetary	policy	and	its	Member	State	members	are	Eurozone	central	bank	
governors;	 accordingly	 this	 violates	 the	 ‘ring	 fence’	 between	 monetary	 and	 supervisory	





In	 terms	 of	 on-going	 controls	 and	 accountability,	 the	 approach	 builds	 on	 the	 ECB’s	
accountability	 for	 monetary	 policy	 but	 introduces	 more	 demanding	 requirements	 with	
respect	 to	 its	 supervisory	 role.
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	Interinstitutional	 Agreement	 between	 the	 Parliament	 and	 ECB	 (2013/694/EU)	 OJ	 L	 320/1;	MoU	











	Further	 obligations	 apply	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 Parliament,	 including	 that	 the	
Chair	(upon	request)	hold	confidential	oral	discussions	with	the	Chair	and	Vice-Chair	of	the	
Parliament’s	competent	committees,	and	to	participate	in	any	Parliamentary	investigations,	
subject	 to	 the	 TFEU.
129
	As	 already	 witnessed,	 the	 Parliament’s	 role	 in	 appointing	 and	
removing	 the	 Chair	 or	 Vice	 Chair	 are	 additional	 controls.
130
	There	 are	 also	 reporting	
obligations	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 national	 Parliaments	 of	 participating	 Member	 States.
131
		
Further,	 the	 ECB	 is	 also	 bound	 by	 general	 due	 process	 requirements;	 there	 is	 an	







A	 similar	 balancing	 act	 between	 independence	 and	 accountability	 pertains	 to	 the	 ECB’s	
supervisory	 functions,	 as	 witnessed	 above	 with	 ESMA.	 Moreover,	 from	 the	 analysis	 in	
section	5.2,	the	Parliament	has	ex	ante	control	and	ex	post	accountability	mechanisms	that	
extend	beyond	those	currently	 in	place	for	ESMA.	Although	these	checks	and	balances	can	











mechanisms	 may	 constitute	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 ECB’s	 independence.	 Yet,	 although	 the	




relationship	may	 again	 be	more	 nuanced	 than	 a	 simple	 trade-off	 between	 independence	
and	 accountability.
136
	In	 particular	 the	 two	 can	 potentially	 complement	 one	 another,	with	
accountability	 being	 capable	 of	 strengthening	 independence.
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	Certainly,	 recent	 Commission	 Proposals	 in	 December	 2017	
include	 visions	 for	 the	 ECB	 to	 supervise	 the	 largest,	 systemic	 investment	 firms	 under	 the	








	IMF,	 FSAP	 Technical	 Note:	 Assessment	 of	 Observance	 of	 Basel	 Principles	 for	 Effective	 Banking	
Supervision	No.18/233	(July	2018);	ECB	(n	111).		
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	ECB	 (n	 111)	 section	 5.1;	 Fabian	 Amtenbrink	 and	 Menelaos	 Markakis,	 ‘Towards	 a	 Meaningful	
Prudential	Supervision	Dialogue	in	the	Euro	Area?	A	Study	of	the	Interaction	between	the	European	





	‘ECB	 Supervisor	 Defends	 Role	 in	 Italian	 Banking	 Crisis’	 Financial	 Times	 (4	 July	 2017);	 cf	 ‘Banco	
Popular	 Process	 Is	 a	Model	 for	 Failing	 Banks’	 Financial	 Times	 (8	 June	 2017);	 Niamh	Moloney,	 ‘EU	
Financial	 Governance	 after	 Brexit:	 The	 Rise	 of	 Technocracy	 and	 the	 Absorption	 of	 the	 UK's	
Withdrawal’	(n	78)	82,	96.	
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numerous	 difficulties,	 ranging	 from	 the	 political	 to	 the	 constitutional,	 in	 simply	 extending	
this	mechanism	to	the	EU’s	capital	markets.	Moreover,	the	ECB/SSM	is	 in	a	more	powerful	
position	 than	 ESMA;	 as	 a	 Treaty	 institution,	 the	 ECB	 has	 power	 and	 authority	 that	 flows	





some	 ambition	 to	 eventually	 frame	 itself	 as	 type	 of	 financial	 market	 equivalent	 to	 the	
ECB/SSM).
150
		 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Parliament	 serving	 as	 an	 accountability	 forum	 via	 the	
Banking	 Dialogue	 is	 noteworthy.
151
	As	 Curtin	 argues,	 part	 of	 the	 Parliament’s	 strategy	
appears	to	be	developing	its	position	as	a	visible	forum	for	critically	debating	agency	actions;	
and	 this	 role	 has	 been	expanding	 in	 recent	 years.
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The	 supervisory	 structure	across	 the	EU	 is	now	one	of	 variable	geometry.	 For	 the	banking	
sector,	the	Eurozone’s	supervisory	set-up	 is	highly	 integrated,	with	major	roles	for	the	ECB	
and	 the	 national	 central	 bank	 representatives	 for	 Eurozone-bank	 supervision.
153
	In	 the	
financial	 sector,	 supervision	 continues	 to	 be,	 mainly,	 a	 Member	 State	 responsibility,	
although	 ESMA’s	 powers	 and	 responsibilities	 are	 increasing.	 The	 Commission’s	 2017	
Proposal	 sets	 out	 a	 suite	 of	 reforms,	 including	 to	 the	 ESAs’	 governance	 and	 funding	
arrangements	 (as	 discussed	 below),	 enhancements	 to	 their	 supervisory	 convergence	
powers,	as	well	as,	for	ESMA,	new	direct	supervisory	responsibilities	over	a	range	of	sectors	
and	actors	(including	in	relation	to	certain	prospectuses,	and	particular	types	of	EU	fund).	A	












































with	 technical	 rule	 making,	 and	 in	 achieving	 supervisory	 convergence.	 Accordingly,	 given	
ESMA’s	slow	and	steady	evolution	as	a	type	of	EU-supervisory	authority	that	is	separate	to	
the	other	ESAs,	this	raises	the	question	whether	there	should	be	a	greater	recalibration	of	its	
governance	and	oversight	 framework	 to	 reflect	 this.
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make	 it	more	 assertive	 vis-à-vis	 the	 national	 authorities.	 Linked	 to	 this,	 the	 Proposal	 also	




Executive	 Board	 comprising	 five	 full-time	 members	 (with	 one	 acting	 as	 Vice-Chair)	 and	




Management	 Board	 is	 elected	 by	 the	 Board	 of	 Supervisors	 and	 is	 dominated	 by	 national	





Chairperson	getting	a	casting	vote	 (as	before,	 the	Commission	participates	 in	a	non-voting	
capacity	 except	 the	 right	 to	 vote	 on	 the	 budget).
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of	 Supervisors’	work	 programme	 and	 budget,	 it	will	 prepare	 decisions	 to	 be	 taken	 by	 the	
Board	of	Supervisors.	This	is	to	facilitate	quicker,	more	streamlined	decision-making,	and	an	
approach	that	 is	more	EU-oriented.	The	Executive	Board	 is	also	attributed	some	important	
decision-making	 powers	 in	 relation	 to	 non-regulatory	 matters.	 These	 are	 geared	 towards	






be	 in	 charge	 of	 setting	 out	 supervisory	 priorities	 for	 NCAs	 via	 Strategic	 Supervisory	 Plans;	
these	 are	 to	 check	 the	 consistency	 of	 national	 authorities’	 work	 programmes	 with	 EU	
priorities	 and	 to	 review	 their	 implementation.
165
		Under	 the	 related	expansions	 to	 ESMA’s	
supervisory	 powers	 under	 the	 CCP	 Proposal,	 an	 additional	 ‘Executive	 Session’	 is	 to	 be	






At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Board	 of	 Supervisors	 remains	 the	 main	 body	 in	 charge	 of	 overall	
guidance	and	decision-making	(save	for	those	decisions	transferred	to	the	Executive	Board),	
and	 the	 Commission’s	 presence	 remains	 undiminished.	 The	 Board’s	 composition	 is	 to	 be	
amended	to	include	the	full	time	members	of	the	Executive	Board	although	these	members	
will	not	have	voting	rights	(whether	on	the	quasi-regulatory	QMV	issues,	or	on	supervisory	
matters	 where	 voting	 is	 by	 simple	 majority).
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	The	 Chair	 also	 remains	 non-voting.	






In	 light	 of	 the	 proposed	 changes,	 the	 Commission	 also	 suggests	 amendments	 to	 ESMA’s	
funding.	 	 It	proposes	 retaining	 the	EU	 funding,	but	 instead	of	 collecting	national	 authority	
contributions,	 it	advocates	combining	EU	funding	with	that	of	 industry	(while	retaining	the	
fees	 ESMA	 receives	 from	 entities	 subject	 to	 direct	 supervision,	 with	 provisions	 to	 avoid	
double	 charges).
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	The	 budgetary	 demands	 from	 ESMA	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 existing	




























As	 observed,	 the	 Proposal	 is	 testament	 to	 ESMA’s	 steady	 rise.	 The	 Commission	 roots	 it	
within	 wider	 moves	 ‘towards	 a	 Single	 European	 Capital	 Markets	 Supervisor’	 (whilst	
tempering	 this	 by	 the	 subsidiarity	 principle	 and	 the	 continued	 role	 of	 the	 national	
authorities).
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and	 firms	 have	 taken	 strong	 stances	 against	 it.
173
	Industry	 concerns	 include	 the	 shift	 in	
funding	 from	 the	 public	 sector	 to	 market	 participants.
174
	Further	 flashpoints	 concern	 the	
composition	 and	 process	 for	 appointing	 the	 full-time	 members	 of	 the	 Executive	 Board,	
which	could	dilute	the	influence	of	the	national	authorities.	Equally,	the	role	of	the	Executive	
Board	 in	 the	 Strategic	 Supervisory	 Plans	 also	 risks	 limiting	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 national	
regulators.
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Given	 these	 various	 tensions,	 it	 is	 notable	 that	 the	 2019	 Council	 Compromise	 Proposal,	
which	forms	the	basis	of	the	trilogue	negotiations	with	the	Parliament,	is	more	restrained	in	
its	 ambition.	 This	 retains	 the	Management	 Board	 (whilst	 reinforcing	 its	 role	 and	 powers),	
and	 broadly	 preserves	 the	 existing	 funding	 structure.
177
		 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	
legislation’s	ultimate	 form	remains	a	matter	of	 speculation,	yet	at	 the	same	time,	 it	 raises	






The	 rationale	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 ESAs	 complements	 the	wider	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 EU	
order	 of	 agencificiation.
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	Niamh	 Moloney,	 ‘EU	 Financial	 Governance	 after	 Brexit:	 The	 Rise	 of	 Technocracy	 and	 the	
Absorption	of	the	UK's	Withdrawal’	(n	78)	111.	
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	Fabrice	Demarigny	 and	Karel	 Lannoo	 (n	 104);	House	of	 Commons	 European	 Scrutiny	Commitee,	
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Selling	 ruling,	 justifications	 for	 transferring	 powers	 based	 on	 agency	 independence,	
















Accordingly,	 this	 section	 speculates	 that	 although	 the	 governance	 reforms	 in	 the	
Commission	 Proposal	 may	 have	 some	 value,	 they	 neither	 fully	 tackle	 the	 shifts	 occurring	
towards	greater	centralisation,	nor	adequately	respects	the	position	of	NCA	experts	on	the	
current	 Board	 of	 Supervisors.	 Given	 this,	 it	 advocates	 further	 refinements	 to	 ESMA’s	
governance	 framework,	 including	 reducing	 the	 Commission’s	 presence	 to	 avoid	 stifling	 its	
autonomy.	 In	 relation	 to	 legitimation	 concerns,	 and	 drawing	 on	 the	 SSM	 case	 study,	 it	
proposes	 that	 there	 could	 be	 a	 greater	 role	 allocated	 to	 the	 Parliament	 with	 respect	 to	
ESMA’s	 oversight	mechanisms.	 ESMA	 is	 politically	 accountable	 to	 the	 Parliament,	 and	 the	
Parliament	 currently	 lacks	 representation	 on	 ESMA’s	 governing	 bodies.	 Moreover	 as	 a	




significant	 role	 as	 a	 forum	 for	 holding	 unelected	 agencies	 to	 account.	 In	 this	 regard,	





As	 observed	 in	 section	 6,	 the	 Commission	 Proposal’s	 governance	 modifications	 envisage	
creating	 an	 independent	 Executive	 Board	 geared	 at	 impartial	 and	 EU-oriented	 decision-
making.	 The	 locating	 of	 certain	 decisions	 in	 the	 Executive	 Board	 is	 designed	 to	 dilute	 the	
Board	 of	 Supervisor’s	 power	 where	 it	 may	 be	 in	 conflict.	 The	 Board	 remains	 the	 main	
intergovernmental	 body	 largely	 in	 charge	 of	 decision-making,	 however,	 and	 ESMA’s	
















advocated	 concerning	 the	 Chair’s	 appointment	 and	 profile;	 and	 the	 funding	 amendments	
seek	to	reduce	the	risk	of	national	interference	through	eliminating	national	contributions.		
	
It	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 strike	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 the	 Member	 States’	 heterogeneous	
interests	and	those	of	the	supranational.	The	Commission’s	Proposal	draws,	to	an	extent,	on	





the	 full-time	 Executive	 Board	members	 a	 vote	 in	 the	 Board	 of	 Supervisors	 on	 supervisory	
matters.
184





not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 that	 the	 NCAs	 in	 the	 Board	 always	 adopt	 self-serving	 national	
positions.	Moreover,	 the	 NCAs	 are	 expert	 and	 closest	 to	 the	 risks	 ESMA	 has	 to	 tackle.
186
	
Accordingly,	 and	 as	 Moloney	 argues,	 additional	 enhancements	 to	 the	 Board’s	 role	 could	
involve	 the	 use	 of	 expert	 Board	 committees	 to	 analyse	 particular	 decisions	 prior	 to	 their	
adoption;	wider	use	of	QMV	 to	ensure	 greater	Board	 interaction;	plus	 the	 introduction	of	














		 In	 this	 regard,	as	 the	Chair	 is	set	 to	
become	 a	 much	 more	 powerful	 player,	 this	 needs	 factored	 into	 the	 level	 of	 their	
administrative	 ranking	 and	 selection	procedure.	 Paring	back	 the	Commission’	 input	 in	 this	
process	 would	 also	 seem	 prudent,	 particularly	 given	 the	 debacle	 witnessed	 above	
surrounding	 the	 appointment	 of	 the	 ESAs’	 first	 Chairpersons.
190
	The	 Parliament	 could	 also	







	More	 radically	 (and	 less	 likely),	 the	 Executive	 Board	 could	 be	 given	 full	 responsibility	 for	























Considering	 the	Commission’s	position	more	generally,	 its	presence	 in	ESMA’s	governance	
structure	 is	 complex.	 	 ESMA	 is	 not	 formally	 accountable	 to	 the	 Commission,	 and	 the	 two	
have	a	close	working	relationship.	Yet	the	Commission	has	considerable	influence	(a	type	of	
teacher-pupil	 dynamic),	which	 can	 risk	 impacting	 on	 ESMA’s	 operational	 freedom,	 and	 its	
presence	 remains	 unchanged	 in	 the	 ESA	 Proposal.
191
	One	 option	 would	 be	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 influence	 to	 be	 diluted	 by	 the	 addition	 of	 Parliament	 representation	within	
ESMA’s	governing	bodies.	 In	 line	with	 the	analysis	 in	 section	3,	 and	as	Craig	 argues,	 given	
that	 ESMA’s	 quasi-regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 mandate	 can	 blur	 the	 line	 between	 the	
technical	and	 the	policy,	 it	 is	not	 readily	apparent	why	 the	Parliament	should	be	excluded	
from	 exercising	 influence	 alongside	 the	 Commission.
192
		 Yet	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 could	
heighten	 the	 risk	 of	 inter-institutional	 wrangling	 within	 ESMA	 whilst	 further	 reducing	 its	
autonomy.	 Accordingly,	 an	 alternative	 could	 be	 to	 recalibrate	 the	 existing	
Commission/ESMA	 relationship	 so	 it	 becomes	 less	 burdensome	 for	 ESMA’s	 independence	








substantive	 amendments	 to	 ESMA’s	 accountability	 structures,	 inspiration	 could	 be	 drawn	
from	 the	 SSM.	 Any	 such	 comparisons	 have	 to	 be	made	 with	 a	 firm	 eye	 on	 their	 distinct	
environments,	 yet,	 the	 SSM	provides	 a	 paradigm	of	 integrated	 supervision,	 and,	 although	
not	immune	from	controversy,	is	bedding	in.	As	noted	above,	the	SSM	is	subject	to	on-going	
‘police	 patrol’	 as	 well	 as	 a	 range	 of	 accountability	 demands	 to	 the	 Parliament.
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Accordingly,	 augmenting	 ESMA’s	 accountability	 in	 this	way	 to	 Parliament	would	 recognise	









activities	 and	 objectives	 (whilst	 remaining	 mindful	 of	 the	 particular	 dynamics	 of	 financial	
market	oversight,	and	ESMA’s	 location	within	this),	 to	 form	a	clear	yardstick	against	which	
ESMA	 is	 to	 be	 assessed.
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ESMA’s	expanding	competencies,	more	 formal,	 regular	appearances	before	 the	Parliament	
should	 be	 implemented.	 A	 form	 of	 Capital	 Markets	 Dialogue	 could	 be	 introduced	 via	
channels	 to	 include	more	 standardised	public	 hearings,	workshops,	 as	well	 as	maintaining	
current	 practices	 (such	 as	 more	 ad	 hoc	 exchanges	 of	 view	 with	 MEPs).	 In	 line	 with	 the	
analysis	 in	 section	 4,	 such	 fora	 could	 require	 ESMA	 and	 the	 Chair	 to	 explain	 and	 justify	












At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 paper	 is	 not	 promoting	 a	 ‘SSM	 for	 Capital	Markets’.	 Although	 the	
general	direction	of	travel	may	ultimately	point	that	way,	this	paper	has	analysed	political,	
legal,	 and	 institutional	 obstacles	 that	 stand	 in	 the	way.	 These	 include	how	 far	Meroni	 has	
been	mellowed,	how	much	article	114	TFEU	can	bend	before	Treaty	 change	 is	needed,	as	
well	 as	 the	 ‘bewildering	 array’	 of	 design	 choices	with	 respect	 to	 how	 to	 split	 supervisory	
responsibilities	between	 the	ESAs,	and	 the	ECB	 in	 the	Banking	Union.
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	Rather,	 given	 that	






place	 to	 temper	any	grand	designs	by	 the	Parliament.	This	 is	 true	of	EU	governance	more	









	Fabian	 Amtenbrink	 and	 Menelaos	 Markakis	 (n	 143);	 Niamh	 Moloney,	 The	 Age	 of	 ESMA	 (n	 5)	
chapter	2.	
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	Mark	 Bovens	 (n	 87).	 In	 this	 regard	 although	 the	 Council	would	 also	 need	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 any	
decision	to	revise	ESMA’s	founding	legislation,	Moloney	argues	that	Parliamentary	disapproval	can	act	


















how	 the	 EU	 operates.
201
	In	 recent	 years,	 agencies	 have	mushroomed,	 and	 ESMA	 now	 has	
far-reaching	 quasi-regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 powers.	 Such	 shifts	 raise	 fundamental	
questions	with	respect	to	its	constitutional	standing,	the	powers	that	can	be	delegated	to	it,	
and	how	to	wrestle	the	competing	challenges	of	its	autonomy	and	accountability.	This	paper	
has	 charted	 the	 rise	 of	 ESMA	within	 the	 agency	 literature,	 and	 via	 an	 examination	 of	 its	
governance	 and	 accountability	 mechanisms,	 as	 well	 as	 drawing	 on	 the	 SSM’s	 operating	
systems,	makes	normative	proposals	for	ESMA’s	framework.	It	argues	that	given	the	greater	
levels	 of	 integrated	 capital	markets	 supervision	 now	occurring,	 ESMA’s	 governance	model	
needs	 recalibrating	 to	better	 recognise	 this	new	reality,	whilst	also	balancing	 this	with	 the	
competing	national	interests.	Strengthening	ESMA	is	not	an	end	in	itself,	however,	and	any	
governance	 refinements	would	 be	 implemented	with	 the	 imposition	 of	 additional	 control	
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